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 1 
No Exception to the Rule: 
The Unconstitutionality of State Immigration Enforcement Laws 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram* 
Much scholarly and judicial ink has recently been spilled analyzing and determining the 
fate of several state and local laws that purport to control immigration, or at least critical aspects 
of immigrants’ lives.1  The Supreme Court has adjudicated disputes between federal and sub-
federal entities in this arena for almost 150 years, siding overwhelmingly with the federal 
government and striking down state and local laws.  Despite this historical and doctrinal 
background, in the last decade, jurisdictions from across the country have renewed these debates 
with particular vigor, once again enacting laws that impact the lives of non-citizens, especially 
undocumented ones.
2
  Such laws run a wide gamut, involving state and local officers in 
immigration enforcement, penalizing businesses for the hiring of unauthorized workers, 
requiring non-citizens to carry proof of lawful status, sanctioning landlords for renting to 
undocumented persons, demanding documentation for voting, and preventing localities from 
enacting sanctuary-type provisions.
3
  Predictably, these ordinances have galvanized bitterly 
contested court battles to determine their constitutionality.
4
  Scholarly commentary, litigation, 
and judicial evaluation of these laws have focused primarily on the propriety of state and local 
involvement in the ostensibly federal realm of immigration regulation. 
The state of Arizona has made itself ground zero for such battles, attempting repeatedly 
through legislation to vindicate states’ ability to participate in immigration regulation.  Arizona’s 
elected officials have garnered significant national attention with passage of the Legal Arizona 
Workers Act (LAWA),
5
 upheld in the Supreme Court’s recent Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States v. Whiting opinion,
6
 and SB 1070,
7
 the notorious state immigration enforcement 
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1
 See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (enjoining city’s anti-illegal immigrant 
ordinance), aff’d in part, vacated in part by 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted and judgment vacated by No. 
10-772, 2011 WL 2175213 (U.S. June 6, 2011); Gabriel Chin, et al., A Legal Labyrinth:  Issues Raised by Arizona 
Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Villazor, Sanctuary Ordinances 
& Immigration Federalism:  A Dialectical Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1661 (2010); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of 
Confusion:  The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008); Michael Wishnie, 
State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004). 
2
 See generally Migration Policy Institute, National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy, State and Local 
Immigration Regulation, available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/integration/regulation.cfm. 
3
 See generally National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19897; National Conference of State Legislatures, Chart of 
2011 Enacted Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in States, available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=23362. 
4
 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (upholding the Legal 
Arizona Worker’s Act); United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (striking down Arizona’s SB 1070); 
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010) cert. granted and judgment vacated by No. 10-772, 2011 
WL 2175213 (U.S. June 6, 2011). 
5
 Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 23-211, 212, 212.01 (2010). 
6
 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011). 
 2 
law, much of it enjoined by the Ninth Circuit in its U.S. v. Arizona opinion.
8
  Arizona has 
recently asked for Supreme Court review, and many predict the case will make its way to the 
high court in the near future. 
In this resurgent contest over sub-federal participation in immigration policy and 
enforcement, the state of Arizona won the most recent battle with Whiting.  There, the Court 
upheld LAWA, which mandates that businesses in the state use the federal E-Verify system to 
check the legal status of their employees, and then penalizes employers who continue to hire 
unauthorized workers by revoking their licenses to do business.  Based on this decision, some 
believe that the Court is poised to re-align federal-state immigration responsibilities, and argue 
that Whiting portends a new era in which states may freely engage in immigration enforcement.
9
 
That proposition, and the limits of sub-federal immigration regulation, will be tested if 
the Court decides to grant certiorari in Arizona.  SB 1070, inter alia, provides state criminal 
penalties for violations of federal immigration law, requires non-citizens to carry proof of lawful 
status, and grants state law enforcement officers the latitude to discover immigration violations 
and enforce immigration law.  Importantly, Arizona has made clear its regulatory purpose in 
enacting SB 1070: 
“The legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make 
attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and 
local government agencies in Arizona.  The provisions of this act 
are intended to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful 
entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons 
unlawfully present in the United States.”10 
In doing so, Arizona boldly declares that it intends to participate in the reduction of unlawfully 
present persons and thus, announces its entry into the core of immigration enforcement and 
policy. 
This Issue Brief concludes that while Whiting may be a welcome sign for sub-federal 
entities desirous of using legal sanctions to discourage local businesses from hiring unauthorized 
workers, it does not otherwise alter the division of power between the nation and states vis-à-vis 
immigration policy.  Fundamentally, Whiting sheds little light on the Court’s potential decision 
in Arizona.  While states may carve out limited regulatory power in the business-licensing area, 
the larger and more important field of immigration enforcement and policy should remain the 
sole province of the federal government.  Undoubtedly, viewed at the highest level of generality, 
LAWA and SB 1070 are both state laws intended to discover and disincentivize the presence of 
undocumented immigrants.  However, state business licensing penalties that punish employers 
                                                                                                                                                             
7
  Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, amended by H.B. 2162 (Ariz. 2010). 
8
 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011). 
9
 See, e.g., Kris Kobach, Law and Border, NATIONAL REVIEW, July 4, 2011, available at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/271090/law-and-border-kris-w-kobach?page=1; John C. Eastman & Karen 
J. Lugo, Arizona’s Immigration Storm, 12 Engage 68 (2011), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/doclib/20110603_EastmanLugoEngage12.1.pdf; Ilya Shapiro, S.B. 1070:  Constitutional but Bad Policy, 
CATO INSTITUTE, July 13, 2011, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=13354. 
10
 S.B. 1070 § 1. 
 3 
are necessarily different than state criminal immigration laws that punish undocumented 
immigrants and seek to achieve “attrition through enforcement.”  Indeed, even apart from the 
putative objects of enforcement of the respective laws, several factors differentiate SB 1070 from 
LAWA, including historical background, the nature of the legal claims and analysis, the identity 
of the plaintiffs, the nature of regulations, and the ramifications of the decisions in other 
constitutional areas.  As such, anti-immigrant and restrictionist forces will celebrate a pyrrhic 
victory with Whiting, but may be disheartened by the final outcome in Arizona. 
To be clear, this is a discussion relevant to more than an isolated, outlier state or city.  
Arizona is not alone.  Inspired by SB 1070, Alabama passed, and is currently defending in court, 
an even more punitive state immigration enforcement law.
11
  So, too, have Georgia and other 
states.
12
  In addition, the consequences of Whiting and Arizona, will determine the viability of 
several current and nascent sub-federal enactments currently in litigation.  Already, in the wake 
of Whiting, the Court vacated and remanded Lozano v. Hazleton,
13
 in which plaintiffs challenged 
the city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania’s ordinance penalizing rental of property to undocumented 
persons and regulating businesses that hire unauthorized workers.
14
  By clarifying the 
responsibility for immigration and immigrant control between federal and non-federal entities, 
these cases will affect broad swaths of our national population, including the nearly 40 million 
non-citizens and the estimated 11-12 million undocumented persons residing in our midst.
15
  The 
sooner the Supreme Court curbs over-enthusiastic state assertions of immigration enforcement 
authority, the sooner state and local governments, police, and public education and social 
systems can regain the trust of, and continue serving, all state residents and communities, 
including the 4 million U.S.-citizen children of undocumented parents.
16
 
Part I of this Issue Brief examines the Court’s methodology and reasoning in the 
business-licensing case, concluding Whiting’s preemption framework cannot justify broader state 
immigration enforcement schemes.  While federal law expressly contemplates and permits 
certain state licensing sanctions, in contrast, enforcement schemes like SB 1070 do not fall into 
any recognized exceptions in federal law, run afoul of federal policy, and incite violations of 
other important constitutional provisions.  Part II considers more wide-ranging immigration 
federalism concerns occasioned by sub-federal enactments like LAWA and SB 1070.  Again, 
here, this paper concludes that the nature of interaction between federal and sub-federal 
sovereigns militates against state power to criminalize unlawful presence and enforce 
immigration policy, other than through federally approved, cooperative agreements.  Finally, 
                                                 
11
 Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2011, Ala. Laws 535, et seq. (2011); 
Richard Fausset, U.S. Sues over Alabama Immigration Law, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/02/nation/la-na-alabama-immigration-20110802. 
12
 GA. CODE §§ 16-5-46, 17-5-100 (2011); S.C. CODE §§ 16-9-460, 23-6-60 (2011); MISS. CODE §71-11-3(c)(i) 
(2011). 
13
 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part, vacated in part by 620 F.3d 170 
(3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted and judgment vacated by No. 10-772, 2011 WL 2175213 (U.S. June 6, 2011). 
14
  Julia Preston, Judge Voids Ordinance on Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/27/us/27hazelton.html; Associated Press, Pennsylvania Town Enacts Strict Illegal 
Immigration Ordinance, FOX NEWS, July 14, 2006. 
15
 JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR. UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION:  NATIONAL 
AND STATE TRENDS 2010 (2011), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf. 
16
 JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR. A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES iii, Fig. 4 (2009), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf. 
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Part III explores the meaning and significance of this recent spate of sub-federal activity, arguing 
that while SB 1070 and its ilk will not withstand judicial scrutiny, they nevertheless sound a 
useful warning and provide a blueprint for federal immigration reform. 
I. Distinguishing Employer Sanctions Laws from Broader Immigration Enforcement 
Schemes 
Courts tasked with evaluating sub-federal policies that purport to control immigration, or 
some aspect of immigrants’ lives, generally focus on structural power analysis – that is, the 
allocation of regulatory power between federal and sub-federal sovereignties.  A long line of 
cases, starting from Chy Lung v. Freeman,
17
 to Hines v. Davidowitz,
18
 Graham v. Richardson,
19
 
De Canas v. Bica,
20
 and finally to contemporary cases like Whiting, showcase this basic 
framework.  Although some of these cases measure state law against constitutional norms and 
structure,
21
 courts are generally wont to avoid constitutional pronouncements unless necessary.
22
  
In the immigration context, the Supreme Court’s avoidance of constitutional rulings in favor of 
statutory decisions generally results in more favorable outcomes for immigrants.
23
 
Grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
24
 the immigration 
preemption framework operates from granular, textual comparison between particular state and 
federal statutes to more nebulous assessments of state schemes against constitutional structure.  
Congress may expressly preempt sub-federal enactments by legislating its preemptive intent into 
a federal statute.  Even if Congress has not legislated its preemptive intent, sub-federal laws may 
still be invalidated if the Court finds that it is impossible to comply with both federal and sub-
federal law at the same time, or when sub-federal law is an obstacle to accomplishing the full 
purpose and objectives of federal law.  More generally, if the Court finds that the Congress 
intended to occupy the entire regulatory field, state laws in that field are also preempted. 
Beyond these preemption methodologies which focus on textual analysis and the 
interplay between federal and sub-federal enactments, in the immigration arena, courts will 
sometimes apply “constitutional” preemption analysis, under which they will strike down a state 
                                                 
17
 92 U.S. 275 (1875) (striking down California law regulating immigration from China, stating that the federal 
government has the exclusive power to regulate immigration). 
18
 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (striking down Pennsylvania alien registration scheme). 
19
 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down Arizona law denying noncitizens’ eligibility for public assistance).  
20
 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (upholding, prior to passage of IRCA, California’s employer-sanctions law for hiring of 
unauthorized workers). 
21
  See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 367-69 (9th Cir. 2011) (Noonan, J., concurring) (arguing that 
SB 1070 interferes with national foreign policy prerogatives, and is therefore unconstitutional on that basis). 
22
 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Building, 408 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (discussing doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance and stating “[if] an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is 
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”); cf. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 
1068 (2011) (focusing solely on narrow, statutory preemption analysis).  
23
 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 548-49, 565 (noting that subconstitutional rulings have been more 
favorable to immigrants). 
24
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 5 
or local ordinance that attempts to regulate “pure immigration law.”25  Constitutional 
preemption, which can be found even in the absence of enacted federal law, occurs when sub-
federal laws attempt to govern entry and exit of noncitizens, and the conditions under which they 
remain in the country.
26
  It is based in the federal government’s plenary power over immigration 
and the federal power to conduct foreign affairs.
27
 
Part I.A explains how the Court employed the express preemption methodology in 
Whiting to uphold the state business-licensing law.  Despite that favorable result for states, Part 
I.B will show that Whiting’s reasoning and methodology actually portend the invalidation of SB 
1070 and other state immigration enforcement schemes.  Finally, Part, I.C discusses other 
constitutional defects with SB 1070. 
A. Express Preemption and State Regulation of Business-Licensing: The Limitations 
of Whiting 
In the immigration context, the Supreme Court has consistently struck down sub-federal 
lawmaking using preemption analysis.  Rarely, sub-federal enactments have survived, but only 
when the state or locality has regulated in an area of traditional state concern, and when the 
federal government had not disapproved of state action.  The most relevant example is De Canas 
v. Bica, in which the Court upheld a 1971 California law that imposed fines on in-state 
employers who knowingly employed unlawfully present persons if such hiring adversely 
affected lawfully present workers.
28
  In preserving California’s employer sanctions law, the 
Court in De Canas noted that while the “power to regulate immigration is unquestionably…a 
federal power,” states nevertheless retain broad police powers over the employment relationships 
of workers within the state.
29
 
De Canas would seem to make LAWA an easy case, but for the fact that Congress can 
respond to state enactments like the California employer sanctions law upheld in De Canas 
(assuming Congress acts within its Article I powers).  Indeed, in 1986, Congress exercised those 
powers by enacting the Immigration Control and Reform Act (IRCA) expressly to preempt state 
laws that sanction employers for the hiring of unauthorized persons.
30
  Taking direct aim at laws 
like California’s unauthorized worker law, IRCA explicitly prohibited sub-federal entities from 
enacting “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through 
licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ…unauthorized aliens.”31  This provision, a 
by-product of one of Congress’ prior attempts to pass comprehensive federal immigration 
reform, provides Arizona with a plausible and specific defense for LAWA, as Congress appears 
                                                 
25
 See Stumpf, supra note 1, at 1600-01. 
26
 Hines, 312 U.S. at 56-60; see also Toll v. Moreno, 45 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (striking down Maryland’s law denying 
certain nonimmigrant state residents in-state tuition rates, and stating “Our cases have long recognized the 
preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within our borders.”). 
27
 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Cases), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (determining that Congress’ 
power to exclude aliens was immune from searching judicial inquiry, and was grounded in the federal government’s 
power to conduct foreign affairs); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 40-44 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
28
 De Canas, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
29
 Id. at 354-56. 
30
 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
31
 Id. § 1324a(h)(2). 
 6 
to have gone out of its way to note that state licensing penalties were to be treated differently 
than direct employer sanctions. 
Read together then, De Canas and IRCA stand for the proposition that state regulation of 
employment relationships between state employers and unlawfully present persons is 
permissible, if the federal government has not otherwise prohibited it.
32
  Thus, the question left 
for the Court in Whiting was an exceedingly narrow one:  Did LAWA count as a “licensing” law 
within the exception written into IRCA?  It is a question that the Court answered with in-depth 
textual analysis and interpretation, focusing primarily on the meaning of “licensing or similar 
law.”33  In fact, the five-member majority took pains to distinguish state licensing laws in the 
employment field from all other manner of state regulation that could affect immigrants.
34
 
This analytic methodology, itself, is the primary indication of the limited utility of 
Whiting to states’ arguments in cases involving other types of state laws.  The Court eschewed 
broad pronouncements regarding the Constitution’s division of federal-state responsibility in the 
area of immigration in favor of a detailed comparison of LAWA’s text to the text of IRCA and 
the federal Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).  This 
methodological point is important because it limits Whiting’s reach to the specific context of 
business licensing-type laws that sanction employers for hiring unauthorized workers.  While 
LAWA achieves the same result as the pre-IRCA California employer sanctions law, IRCA’s 
text and its licensing exception at least provide a colorable basis upon which to uphold LAWA.  
Importantly, the Court’s reasoning requires that, if Congress were to amend IRCA to erase the 
licensing exception, LAWA would also be plainly unconstitutional.  Further, absent the licensing 
exemption, any state attempt to make the federal E-Verify mandatory would also be preempted, 
as the Court would have no basis to believe the federal government authorized states to legislate 
in the immigration-employment arena. 
B. Inapplicability of Whiting to SB 1070 and Judicial Analysis of State Enforcement 
Schemes 
Despite upholding state business-licensing policies that target employers of unauthorized 
workers, the Court will most likely strike down state immigration enforcement schemes like SB 
1070.  Unlike Arizona’s plausible argument for LAWA, the state’s entire legal defense of its 
unilateral decision to criminalize unlawful presence and participate in immigration enforcement 
rests dubiously on a few disparate Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provisions that 
                                                 
32
 Note that this should not be read as an endorsement of either expanded federal use of E-Verify as some have 
proposed, or approval of state business-licensing schemes like LAWA.  Despite Whiting, federal and state use of E-
Verify will still lead to risk of erroneous prosecution.  131 S.Ct. at 1991 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Further, 
serious concerns remain about the expansion of E-Verify into the employment space, as a matter of sound policy. 
See How Expanding E-Verify Would Hurt American Workers and Business, (Immig. Pol’y Center), Mar. 2, 2010, 
available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Everify_030210.pdf. 
33
  See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1978-79, 1987-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reasoning that LAWA cannot be fairly 
termed a “licensing or similar law”, and is therefore preempted by IRCA). 
34
 Id. at 1981, 1983 (“IRCA expressly preempts some state powers dealing with the employment of unauthorized 
aliens and it expressly preserves others…. [LAWA] falls within … the confines of the authority Congress chose to 
leave to the States….” The majority also noted that the several cases in which state laws were preempted involved 
“uniquely federal areas of regulation”). 
 7 
recognize a narrow and well-defined role for states in enforcement matters.  No provision in the 
federal scheme approximates the specificity and lucidity of IRCA’s carved-out exception for 
licensing penalties that formed the sine qua non of the Court’s Whiting opinion.  In addition, the 
Court will strike down laws like SB 1070 because they intrude on the traditionally federal area of 
immigration enforcement.    Defining immigration violations and then enforcing them is a field 
occupied by federal law, leaving room only for supervised, directed, and enumerated forms of 
state involvement. 
Arizona’s SB 1070 attempts to discourage and diminish the presence of undocumented 
immigrants within the state by (1) requiring local law enforcement officers to determine the 
immigration status of any detainee or arrestee they suspect is an unauthorized immigrant,
35
 (2) 
levying state criminal penalties for failure to comply with federal alien registration laws or carry 
a registration document,
36
 (3) providing state criminal penalties for unauthorized persons who 
solicit or perform work,
37
 and (4) allowing warrantless arrest of persons based on probable cause 
that the arrestee is removable from the U.S.
38
  None of the enjoined provisions of SB 1070 are 
saved by any textual exception in the federal immigration law analogous to IRCA and its express 
exemption for business licensing. 
States like Arizona, that have enacted SB 1070-type ordinances essentially advance two 
major arguments in defense of their laws to overcome preemption claims:  (1) state immigration 
laws mirror federal law and are therefore not preempted; and (2) federal immigration law 
provides for state involvement in immigration enforcement, and therefore state immigration 
enforcement schemes are not preempted.
39
  In addition, states may advance a theory of inherent 
state power to enact and enforce immigration laws.
40
  This final catch-all theory of state 
immigration power directly implicates constitutional, as opposed to primarily statutory, 
questions, and will be addressed later in this Issue Brief. 
As both the federal trial court in Arizona and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held, 
neither of the states’ primary defenses survives analysis.41  First, the Supreme Court has already 
held that state law can be preempted even when the state’s purpose echoes the goals of a federal 
policy.
42
  Further, laws like SB 1070 do not mirror the mechanism and consequences of federal 
law.  SB 1070 attaches criminal penalties to conduct and action that federal law only treats as a 
                                                 
35
 Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070 § 2(B), amended by H.B. 2162 (Ariz. 
2010). 
36
 Id. § 3. 
37
 Id. § 5(C). 
38
 Id. § 6. 
39
 See Defendants Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 
2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB).  
40
 See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier:  The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make 
Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005); Eastman and Lugo, supra note 9, at 68 (“Arizona Has Sufficient 
Inherent Police Power to Authorize Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law Alongside Federal Authorities.”). 
41
   See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), affirmed by 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011). 
42
  See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (“The conflicts are not rendered irrelevant by 
the State’s argument that there is no real conflict between the statutes because they share the same goals….  The fact 
of a common end hardly neutralizes conflicting means….”) (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 505 




  Noncitizens who are unlawfully present after having entered lawfully – a 
category into which approximately 40% of the unlawfully present population falls – are 




In addition, as Whiting’s discussion of IRCA highlights, federal law punishes employers 
who hire undocumented workers, but does not attach criminal penalties to unlawfully present 
persons solely for seeking employment.  Because LAWA mimicked this basic structure, it 
survived preemption analysis; it also punished employers without penalizing the workers 
themselves.  Based on Whiting’s reasoning, if Arizona had included criminal penalties against 
unauthorized workers as part of LAWA, the law would certainly have been declared 
unconstitutional; it would not have mirrored federal law, and IRCA’s licensing exception would 
not have provided safe harbor.  SB 1070, in comparison, criminalizes exactly this behavior, 
levying sanctions on unlawfully present persons for the state crime of seeking employment while 
unauthorized to work.  By definition then, SB 1070, with its criminal penalties, is not a facsimile 
of federal law. 
Even though laws like SB 1070 use federal immigration status as the touchstone for state 
criminal consequences, and are ostensibly enacted to help ensure enforcement of federal 
immigration law, such state policies still violate federal prerogatives.  Decisions to use 
congressionally-defined immigration status as the trigger for civil and criminal consequences are 
left to the federal executive, not to individual states.  As part of the executive’s Article II duties, 
the President is tasked with “taking care” that federal laws are carried out.45  Using this authority, 
the prosecutorial branch of the Department of Homeland Security routinely issues directives on 
the priority order for arrest of unlawfully present persons, and the use of prosecutorial discretion 
and deferral for some unlawfully present persons.
46
  As federal courts have held, this discretion 
and its impact on on-the-ground enforcement is integral to defining the limits and meaning of 
                                                 
43
 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006) (delegating removability decisions to immigration judges, not federal courts); 
Harisidades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (reaffirming that deportation is a civil procedure, not a criminal 
one).  SB 1070 makes it a state crime to be unlawfully present, subject to prosecution in a state court; in comparison, 
the Immigration and Nationality Act generally treats unlawful presence as a civil transgression, subject to an 
administrative procedure.  See Margaret Stock, Arizona v. United States: The Tail Wagging the Dog on Regulating 
Immigration Enforcement, SCOTUS BLOG, July 14, 2011, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/arizona-
v-united-states-the-tail-wagging-the-dog-on-regulating-immigration-enforcement/. 
44
 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (2006).  The remaining unlawfully present persons are likely those who entered 
without inspection.  In addition to making one removable, unlawful entry can be charged as a federal misdemeanor 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1325, although federal authorities routinely do not – either because of resource constraints or 
exercises of discretion – prosecute it.  See Ingrid Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1329-
1334 (2010). 
45
 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.  
46
 Memorandum from John Morton, Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the 
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 3 (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf; see also Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal 
Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Prosecutorial Discretion (Oct. 24, 2005), available at 
http://www.shusterman.com/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretionimmigration1005.pdf (setting out reasons, principles, and 
guidelines for exercise of prosecutorial discretion by federal immigration prosecutors). 
 9 
federal enforcement law and policy.
47
  Thus, states’ adopting different schemes to achieve 
ostensibly similar goals fails to mirror these nuances of federal policy, and further, usurps the 
President’s power of execution.48 
The state’s second major claim – that federal law already contemplates state involvement 
in enforcement – also does not survive preemption inquiry.  SB 1070 is a unilaterally-created, 
federally-unsupervised state enforcement scheme that requires enforcement of all manner of 
criminal and civil immigration law violations.  Devastating to Arizona’s argument, federal law 
envisions state cooperation in immigration enforcement only for certain criminal violations or 
under direct supervision and express agreement with the federal government. 
Federal law, in isolated and circumscribed instances, permits state involvement in 
immigration enforcement.  Section 287(g) of the INA authorizes the federal government to enter 
into a “written agreement” with a state to allow qualified state officers to perform investigations 
and detentions of non-citizens.
49
  Other sections of 8 U.S.C. §1357 permit, without written 
agreement, voluntary communication of state officers with federal officials regarding the 
immigration status of an individual and the cooperation of state officers with the federal 
officials.
50
  Further, 8 U.S.C. §1252c authorizes state officials to arrest and detain individuals 
who have illegally reentered the country after deportation, and §1324 allows state officers to 
arrest those who might be smuggling, transporting, or harboring unlawful migrants. 
While these isolated sections of the INA permit state involvement in immigration 
enforcement, that permission is bound to particular circumstances.
51
  Under 287(g), general state 
involvement in immigration law enforcement can occur only under written agreement with the 
federal government and under conditions in which the federal officials have provided training to 
local officers on immigration enforcement.  Thus, the only state assistance contemplated by 
287(g) is closely supervised, contractually agreed upon cooperation; not the freewheeling, 
unilateral state enforcement envisioned by SB 1070.  Sections 1252c and 1324 are limited to 
defined conduct (illegal reentry and smuggling, respectively) and deal with criminal, not civil, 
violations.  Because Congress has already contemplated state participation in immigration 
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 United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 351-52 (9th Cir. 2011) (“By imposing mandatory obligations on state and 
local officers, Arizona interferes with the federal government’s authority to implement its priorities and strategies in 
law enforcement….[§ 2B] interferes with Congress’ delegation of discretion to the Executive Branch in enforcing 
the INA.”); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 212 (2010) (“The Supreme Court has consistently found state 
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cert. granted and judgment vacated by No. 10-772, 2011 WL 2175213 (U.S. June 6, 2011). 
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 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2062-65 (2008) (“De facto policy is 
still policy, and federal immigration law is a matter of inaction as much as affirmative decisionmaking.  
Consequently, any decisions by state and local officials put them in conflict with the knowing balance of 
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49
 8 U.S.C. §1357(g) (2006). 
50
  Id. at §1357(g)(10). 
51
 The Secure Communities Program also bears mentioning for its use of state and local law enforcement officers in 
immigration enforcement.  Under S-Comm, the fingerprints of state and local arrestees are automatically checked 
against federal criminal and immigration databases, ostensibly to identify criminal noncitizens.  See Secure 
Communities, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities.  S-Comm, in 
contrast to the types of state involvement discussed in this Issue Brief, is a federal program, created and 
administered by DHS, utilizing sub-federal arrest authority to further immigration goals in a manner dictated by the 
federal government. 
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enforcement, but relegated such cooperation to specific crimes or under specific procedures, the 
Court will most likely rule that Congress has occupied the field and SB 1070 is impliedly 
preempted. 
Indeed, to rule otherwise is to accept implausible and logically flawed premises.  The 
Court would have to read federal authorization for states to participate in certain instances, under 
fixed conditions, as a general authorization for states to unilaterally participate in immigration 
law enforcement under conditions determined by the state itself.  Relatedly, it would have to 
interpret the federal law’s isolated permissions for particular types of state involvement – and 
exclusion of others – as somehow meaning that Congress really meant to include what it 
excluded from the statute.  In other words, the Court would have to, under the guise of 
preemption analysis, wholly rewrite the INA and render several sections of federal immigration 
law superfluous and toothless.  Why list particular crimes and conditions of state cooperation if 
the federal statute is to be read to authorize state enforcement under any circumstances for any 
type of immigration violation?  Congress need not have bothered to deliberate and legislate the 
287(g) system of federally-supervised, written agreements between the federal and states 
governments if it was actually authorizing unwritten, unwelcome, unsupervised, and untrained 
state and local immigration enforcement.  Statutory drafting and federal court interpretation of 
that drafting simply doesn’t work the way Arizona needs it to, and for good reason. 
Under this well-established interpretative framework, the state’s only recourse is to 
persuade the Court of a highly dubious proposition:  that states have inherent constitutional 
authority to enforce all manner of federal immigration law, without agreement or permission 
from the federal government.  Such a reading drastically alters the long-standing constitutional 
balance between the federal and state governments vis-à-vis immigration enforcement.  The 
Supreme Court has never endorsed a unilateral expansion of state law enforcement power into a 
historically federal domain.  To the contrary, the Supreme Court has long been wary of state 
intrusion into federal immigration law.
52
  In the end, to support this implausible claim, states are 
forced to rely on one, non-binding, Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum from the George W. 
Bush administration in 2002 supporting states’ claims of inherent authority to enforce 
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 See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941) (“That the 
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1787, and has since been given continuous recognition by this Court.”).  Further, circuit courts have expressed 
concern and doubt about state or local authority to enforce immigration law generally, or the civil provisions of 
federal immigration law, specifically.  See Michael Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration 
Laws, 6 U. PA. CONST. L.J. 1084, 1089-1095 (2004) (citing Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(upholding city police arrest for criminal violations of immigration law, but assuming that federal law preempts state 
and local authority to enforce civil immigration law) and Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(questioning New Jersey park ranger authority to detain individuals for immigration violations)).  In addition, note 
that Professor Hiroshi Motomura has powerfully critiqued the civil-criminal distinction drawn by Gonzales v. 
Peoria, arguing that any sub-federal immigration arrest (civil or criminal) usurps the critical discretionary stage of 
immigration enforcement from the federal government and will likely change federal enforcement priorities and 
consume federal resources.  Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters, Federal Immigration Enforcement, 




  But before that recent turn, the OLC had long-been convinced of the exact 
opposite conclusion.
54
  More importantly, the legal reasoning used by Assistant Attorney General 
Jay S. Bybee to reach his ahistorical and unprecedented 2002 opinion has been roundly criticized 
as “mak[ing] little sense”55 and “misconstr[uing]” prior decisions.56  Thus, what might be 
mistakenly interpreted as a two-sided debate, in truth, boils down to one aberrant view set 
against a consistent narrative distrustful of state intrusion into immigration enforcement.
57
 
Beyond this comparison between federal and sub-federal laws, the identity of the 
respective plaintiffs and enforcement targets make the SB 1070 case easy to resolve against the 
state of Arizona.  Whereas Whiting was brought by private business interests represented by the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the plaintiff in U.S. v. Arizona is the federal government itself.  
This fact is significant because the Supreme Court is likely to give more weight to the federal 
government’s attempt to protect erosion of its own power than it is to a private party asserting 
that the federal government’s supremacy was violated by state action.58  Indeed, while the U.S. is 
jealously guarding its control over immigration enforcement in the SB 1070 case, the U.S.’s 
briefing to the Court in Whiting, in contrast, explained that mandatory use of E-Verify would not 
overburden the federal government’s data systems.  In essence, the federal government in that 
case disagreed with the contention that its prerogatives would be compromised by state action. 
C. Other Constitutional Flaws in State Immigration Enforcement Schemes 
Of equal or greater concern than those bringing the respective suits, are those against 
whom the laws will be enforced.  Just like the federal policy effected by IRCA, business-
licensing laws strike at employers.  IRCA and these state licensing laws reduce the incentive for 
job-seeking migration by punishing businesses that hire unauthorized workers; importantly, they 
do not punish the putative unauthorized employees themselves.  This policy reflects the shared 
moral and legal culpability for undocumented migration between business enterprises and the 
migrants themselves.  While migrants may make decisions to circumvent lawful entry 
procedures, their ability to obtain employment in the United States is in the hands of employers 
willing to hire them.  The federal decision to focus workplace immigration enforcement on 
employers, and not unauthorized workers, reflects the underlying notions that some citizens also 
                                                 
53
  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John Ashcroft, Attorney 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Non-Preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to 
Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations (Apr. 3, 2002) (on file with author). 
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 Memorandum from Teresa Wynn Roseborough, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens (Feb. 5, 1996), available at 
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Relation to NCIC Wanted Person File, (Apr. 11, 1989), available at 
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 Wishnie, supra note 52, at 1095.  
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 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Secrete Immigration Enforcement Memo Exposed (Sept. 7, 2005), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/secret-immigration-enforcement-memo-exposed. 
57
 See generally Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position:  Why Inviting Local 
Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 966, 975-78 (2004). 
58
 Kevin R. Johnson, S.B. 1070: Federal Preemption and Why the Court Won’t Address Civil Rights Issues, 
SCOTUS BLOG, July 11, 2011, http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/s-b-1070-federal-preemption-and-why-the-
court-won%E2%80%99t-address-civil-rights-issues/. 
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bear responsibility for undocumented migration and that workers require protection regardless of 
immigration status. 
Enforcement schemes like SB 1070, in contrast, mobilize the might of state governments 
directly against undocumented persons.  This is more than simply a rhetorical or trivial 
distinction.  Indeed, state enforcement directly against undocumented persons for immigration 
violations raises grave constitutional concerns of racial injustice and due process separate from 
the preemption and structural power concerns.
59
  Supporters of SB 1070 implausibly argue that 
racial profiling against Latinos and others who “look” foreign or undocumented will not occur 
because the law expressly forbids law enforcement officers “to consider race, color, or national 
origin in implementing the requirement of [the law] except to the extent permitted by the United 
States or Arizona Constitution.” 60 
First, it belies logic and human experience to believe that this statutory language will 
prevent implicit use of race, color, and apparent national origin, when officers are tasked with 
determining the legal status of an individual whom they have “reasonable suspicion” to believe is 
unauthorized, or when they need “probable cause” to believe the individual has committed a 
removable offense.  Second, by allowing use of these constitutionally suspect factors “to the 
extent” permitted by U.S. or Arizona law, the statute perversely endorses use of race, color, and 
national origin by local police officers.
61
  In U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, a 1975 Supreme Court 
decision regarding U.S. border enforcement actions near the U.S.-Mexico border, the Court 
reasoned that “the likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high 
enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor.” 62  Not to be outdone, the Arizona 
Supreme Court opined that while “Mexican ancestry” and “Hispanic appearance” alone may not 
be sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion, those factors coupled with a “dress” or “hair 
style” associated with Mexican identity could be.63  Further, under the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, officers may escape liability by proffering any objectively reasonable 
basis for stopping and investigating an individual – even a pre-textual one that masks the 
officers’ true motivations.64 
Given this legal backdrop, the “prohibition” written into SB 1070 not only fails to 
prevent racially disparate enforcement, it actually appears to encourage it.
65
  Even with SB 1070 
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 See generally Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling Became the Law of the Land:  United States v. Brignoni-
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 See Carol Swain, Why the Court Should Uphold S.B. 1070, SCOTUS BLOG, July 14, 2011, 
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 See Chin, et al., supra note 1, at 47, 65-68. 
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  422 U.S. 873, 885-888 (1975). 
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 State v. Gonzales-Guitierrez, 927 P.2d 776, 780 (Ariz. 1996). 
64
 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (upholding plainclothes officers stop and drug arrest, where 
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65
 Chin, et al., supra note 1, at 68. 
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yet to go into effect, Arizona officials, including vocal proponent of rigorous enforcement, 
Sheriff Joe Arpaio, have repeatedly been sued for violating the civil rights of immigrants.
66
  
Empowering state and local law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration law and 
new state immigration crimes will only exacerbate civil liberties concerns.  Thus, aside from 
preemption problems with state immigration enforcement schemes, the equality and due process 
concerns alone are sufficient basis upon which the Court could and should declare them 
unconstitutional. 
********* 
In sum, the Court’s decision to uphold LAWA against preemption claims does not predict 
the same for SB 1070.  While both clearly intend to discourage the presence of undocumented 
immigrants, federal law contemplates the existence of state business-licensing laws through a 
textual exception in federal immigration law itself.  And, even with this express exception, 
Whiting is neither a unanimous nor far-reaching opinion.  At most, Whiting stands for the 
proposition that state business-licensing laws that regulate employers will not reflexively be 
struck down.  Arizona’s SB 1070, in contrast, is not saved by a textual exception to the federal 
regulatory scheme that defines civil and criminal immigration violations and prescribes the 
circumstances for federal and state cooperation in enforcement of those laws.  A state’s decision 
to create its own immigration crimes and engage its law enforcement officers in civil and 
criminal immigration regulation, untethered from federal oversight, violates basic notions of 
federal supremacy and likely creates equal protection and due process concerns as well. 
II. Immigration Regulation:  Federal v. State Domains 
While the Court’s analysis will likely focus on the statutory preemption framework 
discussed above, the recent increase in sub-federal immigration enactments – from employer 
sanctions to rental ordinances to state immigration crimes – raises a more elemental question 
about the respective roles of federal and sub-federal governments vis-à-vis immigrants and 
immigration.  Even as courts wrestle with the intricacies of statutory interpretation and 
congressional intent to determine conflicts between federal and state laws in this area, courts 
must also make judgments about the proper allocation of immigration power and the power over 
immigrants. 
Consider, for example, the business-licensing laws that target employers of unauthorized 
workers.  Both Whiting, and De Canas before it, rely on the notion that employer relationships 
are traditionally the province of states, even if immigration control has traditionally been the 
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 Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, One Year After Arrest and Detention CCR Legal Observer to 
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province of the federal government.  In essence, courts must make some determination – whether 
explicitly or implicitly – regarding where they think any particular regulation falls on the 
spectrum of traditional state sovereignty and control versus constitutionally-conferred federal 
power.  Focusing specifically on enforcement schemes like SB 1070, this federalism balance tips 
in favor of the federal government. 
As mentioned above, Arizona could prevail in the SB 1070 case if the Court were to rule 
that states have inherent power to enforce immigration laws.  To do so, however, effects lasting 
and permanent change to the constitutional order.  It would render the realm of immigration 
federalism beyond the future reach of either Congress or state lawmakers, and deprive them of 
the opportunity to engage in iterative legislating vis-à-vis immigration enforcement.  In this 
regard, the evolution from De Canas to IRCA to Whiting marks an on-going legislative 
conversation between state and federal governments.  Because the Court made a limited, 
statutory ruling in Whiting, Congress could in the future, delete IRCA’s exemption and 
invalidate LAWA.  Alternatively, if Congress is not bothered by the result in Whiting, it could 
choose to leave IRCA unmodified and allow states to continue enacting business-licensing laws.  
In contrast, were the Court to hold that states have inherent authority in immigration 
enforcement, it would leave the federal government no ability to set its immigration priorities 
through policy debate and representative governance. 
Undoubtedly, regulating for the public welfare and maintaining local policing are within 
the traditional province of states.
67
  But, the creation of a state scheme of immigration crimes and 
local enforcement of federal immigration laws are exactly the types of sub-federal policy the 
Court has repeatedly struck down.
68
  This is because, at base, defining immigration crimes and 
calibrating enforcement are things that the federal government – and only the federal government 
– has historically done.  Although some states had immigration laws in the early and middle 




 those existed before Congress began exercising its power of 
naturalization and foreign commerce to establish federal legislation defining the qualifications, 
conditions, and procedures for entry, residence, and expulsion from the country.  Since the late 
1800’s, the basics of immigration law – entry, exit, naturalization, and duration and conditions of 
stay – have been under federal control.  State participation, in areas such as business-licensing, 
welfare provision, and supervised, cooperative enforcement, have all been at the pleasure and 
discretion of the federal government, permitted by delegations and exceptions legislated into 
federal policy. 
When Arizona or any other state boldly announces that the intent of their policy is 
“attrition through enforcement,” it unambiguously declares its intention to enter the core of 
immigration law and policy.  The Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion, labeling SB 
1070 the state’s “own immigration law enforcement policy.”  Notably, this section of SB 1070 
was not enjoined, as the District Court concluded that “[t]he Court cannot enjoin a purpose; the 
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Arizona Legislature is free to express its viewpoint and intention as it wishes, and Section 1 has 
no operative function.”  While the statute’s purpose alone cannot define crimes or enforcement, 
it clearly affects how law enforcement officers interpret the operative sections of the law.  And, 
because it expressly states Arizona’s desire to rid itself of the undocumented immigrant 
population through enforcement – an exclusively federal function – it could indeed be sufficient 
basis to declare the entirety of the statute unconstitutional under constitutional preemption 
principles. 
Aside from usurping core immigration policy functions, the other problem with state 
immigration enforcement policies is their subversion of federal immigration priorities.  Like 
Arizona, the federal government is interested in discovering and apprehending unlawfully 
present persons.  However, given the scale of the issue, the complexity of immigration status and 
removability determinations, economic realities, and resource limitations, the federal government 
does not arrest and remove all unlawfully present persons.
70
  This is especially true as applied to 
noncitizens who have not committed serious crimes or otherwise broken immigration laws.  In 
fact, as prioritized by the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), federal field 
agents and prosecutors are to focus their attention on those undocumented persons who (1) are 
national security risks, (2) are serious felons or have lengthy criminal records, (3) are known 
gang members, and (4) have an egregious record of immigration violations.
71
  Arizona’s SB 
1070, by requiring the discovery of legal status of stopped and detained individuals, those who 
fail to carry an alien registration document, those who solicit work without authorization, and 
those whom officers believe may have committed a removable offense, subverts the federal 
government’s priority order.  Indeed, Arizona’s law appears intentionally crafted to catch the 
most easily discoverable and least culpable among unlawfully present persons, in the dogged 
pursuit of “attrition” regardless of national public safety priorities. 
Relatedly, state enforcement schemes necessitate substantial federal involvement.  State 
business-licensing sanctions are, for the most part, wholly contained state actions.  State 
authorities handle the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of LAWA violations.  The 
federal government’s involvement is limited to the state’s use of the federal E-Verify database to 
check the lawful work status of the individual employee.  The United States, writing amicus 
curaie in Whiting, confirmed that such usage was consistent with its purpose in creating the 
program, and that mandatory usage by all Arizona businesses would not overburden the 
system.
72
  Further, once the federal database is accessed and issues a response, state prosecutors 
and state courts are responsible for punishing the offending employer.  The statute requires the 
state to “notify” federal authorities, but the federal government need not take any action.  
Arizona accomplishes its goals without further federal involvement. 
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Enforcement schemes like SB 1070, however, are not self-contained and require 
substantial federal resources to complete.  Arizona’s goal of “attrition” – i.e., reduction in the 
presence of unlawfully present persons – can only truly be realized by prosecution and removal 
of those persons from the United States.  Although individuals convicted under the various 
provisions of SB 1070 must satisfy state criminal punishments, the state of Arizona cannot 
remove them.  Only the federal government can issue a Notice to Appear in front of an 
immigration judge and an Order of Removal, and actually, physically remove an individual from 
the country.
73
  State immigration arrest authority, even for federally-defined immigration crimes, 
alters the dynamics, priorities, and resource-use of the federal civil removal system.  SB 1070 
compounds the existing problem of state arrests for federal criminal immigration violations by 
funneling state arrests for federal civil immigration violations and state arrests for state criminal 
immigration violations into the federal system.  It thereby exponentially increases the burdens on 
a federal enforcement and removal scheme of limited capacity.
74
  In stark contrast to Whiting, 
where the federal government acquiesced in and encouraged Arizona’s use of federal resources, 
in the SB 1070 context, the U.S. responded by filing suit against the state; doing so 
unequivocally expresses the federal government’s disagreement with this form of resource 
diversion by a state. 
These problems with a state immigration enforcement scheme – its subversion of national 
enforcement priorities, its inability to effect removal, its deterrence of non-citizen residence 
within the state, and its necessitation of substantial federal involvement – contribute to a final 
national problem:  uniformity in immigration policy.  When imagined as a subset of U.S. foreign 
policy or as an expression of Congress’ uniform power over naturalization, immigration law, as a 
constitutional matter, must be harmonized and unitary.
75
  By creating state criminal penalties 
based on unlawful presence and activity in the United States, and embarking on a unilateral path 
of attrition through enforcement, Arizona has essentially decided to part ways with the nation as 
a whole, and other individual states who retain fidelity to federal immigration policy.  Such a 
position is undesirable vis-à-vis relations with foreign nations.
76
  Further, since Arizona cannot 
actually remove unlawfully present persons, the only possible outcome of rigorous SB 1070 
enforcement is movement of immigrants, both lawful and unlawful, into other states.  
Effectively, Arizona exports its perceived public policy problems to neighboring states.
77
  These 
types of state policies violate fundamental principles of free movement enshrined in the 
Constitution,
78
 create state regulatory races to the bottom,
79
 and undermine uniform national 
responses to national problems. 
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Undoubtedly, even with regard to immigrants and immigration, the Constitution and 
federal statutes tolerate some differentiation and policy experimentation.  LAWA and state 
business-licensing laws are one example.  In addition, federal law delegates to states the power 
to deny state welfare benefits to certain non-citizens;
80
 and some states allow undocumented 
students to pay in-state tuition at state universities.
81
  In these instances, states have taken non-
uniform positions vis-à-vis immigrants.  But these variations are permitted in state policies using 
(1) the states’ own resources, in (2) areas of extensive and traditional state regulation, and 
pursuant to (3) federal permission for states to engage in the activity.  They lend no support to 
state immigration enforcement schemes.  Unlike the examples cited, state immigration 
enforcement laws like SB 1070 strike at the heart of federal immigration prerogatives.  They are 
attempts to control the entry, exit, and stay of non-citizens, in a manner unauthorized by federal 
law, and requiring the expenditure of substantial federal resources.  Therefore, the disharmony 
created by Arizona’s – and other isolated states’ – unilateral exclusion policy cannot be tolerated 
in our federalist system. 
In addition to corrupting federal-subfederal interactions, state enforcement schemes also 
upset intra-state dynamics by requiring local officers to perform tasks beyond their training, and 
inappropriately diverting local resources away from local community policing.  SB 1070 §6 asks 
local law enforcement officers to arrest individuals if the officer has probable cause to believe 
the person to be arrested has committed a removable offense.  Determining what constitutes a 
“removable offense,” however, is no simple task.  There exists no database or convenient list of 
removable offenses; rather, whether an offense is a removable offense requires careful 
adjudication by those trained in immigration law.  And, the INA contains several exceptions, 
waivers, and defenses to removal, even if one has committed a removable offense.  As Justice 
Alito noted in Padilla v. Kentucky, “professional organizations and guidebooks … are right to 
say that ‘nothing is ever simple with immigration law’ – including the determination whether 
immigration law clearly makes a particular offense removable.”82  Given this complex 
immigration background, it is a mystery how local police officers in Arizona will determine 
proper arrestees under this provision. 
Relatedly, by mandating that local officers perform tasks outside their expertise, state 
immigration enforcement schemes undermine local policing efforts themselves.
83
  Sub-federal 
immigration enforcement schemes alienate immigrant communities and cannibalize state and 
local resources that should be used for traditional policing efforts.  Thus, they perversely 
decrease public safety.  Notably, these allegations are not the propaganda of immigrant-activist 
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groups; rather, they are the expert opinion of those with the greatest experience and knowledge 
of local policing dynamics.  Many state and local officials, including local law enforcement 
organizations, have resisted the calls to engage in immigration enforcement because of the toll it 
takes on the traditional public safety duty of state and local police.
84
  The position taken by these 
state and local officials – and by jurisdictions enacting sanctuary ordinances – underscores a 
lurking reality likely to influence the Court:  immigration enforcement simply does not look or 
feel like the type of regulatory activity in which sub-federal entities should engage in a federalist 
system that divides responsibility for national and local public policy challenges. 
III. The Lesson of Arizona and SB 1070:  The Need for Federal Immigration Reform 
One thing that the authors and supporters of restrictive state immigration laws, on the one 
hand, and immigrant-activists and opponents of such measures, on the other, can agree on:  U.S. 
immigration policy needs fixing.  These opposing camps may vehemently disagree on the 
substantive particulars of immigration reform.  However, at base, both recognize that the 
unlawful migration should be addressed, and that something should be done regarding those 
unlawfully present persons already in the country. 
Proponents of sub-federal immigration regulation, like SB 1070 and LAWA, use as their 
starting point, the fact that United States law has been violated by those who enter or remain 
unlawfully present.  From this original sin, enforcement advocates argue that any dalliance in 
capturing and deporting unlawful migrants breeds disrespect for the rule of law, and 
governmental leniency towards this group may encourage more unlawful entry and presence.
85
  
This position is not without any merit. 
The real problem is that, from this starting point, enforcement advocates draw the wrong 
conclusion.  Migration has been, and always will be, a fact of human existence.  Human 
movement to find work or reunite with family would be unremarkable, but for the legal 
construction of political borders between nation-states.  But, these man-made demarcations have 
never, and will never, stem the tide of migrants in search of work and improved opportunities for 
themselves and their families.  Further, the United States relies on, and requires, significant 
migration to fill its economic needs in both high-skilled and labor sectors.
86
  Increased border 
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vigilance and enforcement, combined with a mismatch between actual labor needs and lawful 
entry visas, has only led to increases in the undocumented population, greater number of border 
deaths, and increases in human smuggling prices paid to cartels and coyotes.
87
  These are the 
hard and uncontrovertable economic, social, and human facts. 
Thus, the crisis of legal legitimacy created by unenforced or ineffective federal 
immigration law (cited by advocates as reason for state involvement) cannot be solved by robust 
state and local enforcement of those federal laws.  The sensible resolution to this perceived crisis 
requires enacting immigration laws that account for the geographic, economic, and social 
realities and needs of the United States and the population of putative immigrants.  Rational 
immigration policy that reflects our country’s true needs means increasing the number of lawful 
entry visas for both temporary and permanent workers.  In addition, it requires eliminating or 
restructuring per-country limits on visas that have created insurmountable waitlists and backlogs 
from countries of high immigration like Mexico, China, and India.  Unsurprisingly, the majority 
of the unlawfully present population – whether through illegal entry or visa overstay – hails from 
countries with years-long waiting lists for lawful entry.
88
  Finally, a rational immigration policy 
requires practical responses to the existing undocumented population, currently estimated to 
number 11 to 12 million persons.  On this score, immigration reform must at least include the 
DREAM Act to ensure that undocumented college students and military personnel have the 
opportunity to remain in and benefit the country.
89
 
While mass deportation might be the emotional, knee-jerk response of restrictionist 
forces, it is clearly fantastical.  Further calls for mass deportation will only exacerbate the crisis 
of legitimacy already plaguing immigration policy.  Arizona’s SB 1070 has the potential to 
criminalize the estimated 400,000 unlawfully present persons in the state. Actual discovery and 
prosecution of this entire population, and their subsequent removal, is practically impossible.  In 
total, with current resources and capacity, the federal government can only deport a maximum of 
400,000 noncitizens per year nationwide.
90
  Thus, SB 1070 only widens the gap between law and 
on-the-ground realities, further increasing the legitimacy crisis in immigration law.  In contrast, 
the suggested comprehensive immigration reforms better match law, reality, and need, thus 
producing greater fidelity to our nation’s immigration law. 
The existence of SB 1070, its copycats, and the general increase in sub-federal 
immigration regulation, is an indication of the urgent need for this reform.  In passing LAWA, 
then-Governor, now-Secretary of DHS Janet Napolitano, described Arizona as backed into a 
corner by the lack of federal leadership.  She noted that despite the fact that LAWA might be a 
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“business death penalty,”91 pressing public policy concerns occasioned by unlawful immigration 
compelled Arizona to take sub-optimal legislative steps.  The empirical validity of this claim 
aside, these types of enactments from across the country are a clear message that federal 
immigration reform is not just a national priority, it is a national imperative. 
Just as undocumented migration is an unchangeable fact in the absence of immigration 
reform, so too will be sub-federal immigration laws like LAWA and SB 1070.  While the United 
States and advocacy groups are likely to prevail in their suits against these emerging laws, 
valuable public resources have been squandered both enacting and defending those laws, and 
subsequently, protesting and challenging those laws.  Even if the Court ultimately strikes down 
SB 1070, it is a virtual certainty that the next generation of sub-federal immigration laws, 
slightly modified from the original version, will emerge, perhaps from Arizona again.  Whiting, 
U.S. v. Arizona, Lozano, and their ilk are the beginning of an absurd cycle, not its end.  The 
message to the citizenry and elected officials – both federal and sub-federal – is that the sooner 
we address our immigration concerns through systemic, nation-wide reform, the sooner we can 
channel resources to other important national priorities. 
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